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Trust is at the heart of the intelligence business. Given that most intelligence activities
are conducted in secret, the people have to trust intelligence services to perform well
and to work for the wider public good. Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones suggests in the conclusion
of his new book that, in the twentieth century, secret intelligence “acquired the repu-
tation of being not just a means of winning wars, but a means also of preventing them”
(). Yet trust is a fragile thing, as demonstrated by the ongoing debates following
whistleblower Edward Snowden’s revelations about the extensive use of mass surveil-
lance tools by the NSA and GCHQ. Jeffreys-Jones’s book ponders the important
question: why did we ever start trusting spies?
In In Spies We Trust: The Story of Western Intelligence, the author provides an
insightful history of the Anglo-American intelligence relationship. Describing the
beginning of this eventually close liaison as a “coincidence” (), the author continues
to explore major aspects of the relationship. He argues that the bond has changed con-
siderably over time, from the United States being a close partner to Britain to being
merely “a more distant cousin” in the aftermath of the decision to invade Iraq in
. In the final section of the book, the focus is on the search for alternative – i.e.
non-American – partners for British intelligence, focussing on Europol and
European intelligence more broadly.
This history of Anglo-American intelligence is embedded in a wider cultural and
sociopolitical analysis. For example, pondering the example of U-, the intelligence
unit of the US Department of State until its abolition in , the author reflects
on the Anglophilia of America’s elite, and a general elitist mindset, at the time, and
explores issues of distrust towards other countries. A desire to “knock the French”
is emphasized as a feature of the embryonic Anglo-American relationship. While in-
timate historical moments are well described, for example the unfolding of “the first
Anglo-American covert operation of the Cold War” () with the aim to overthrow
the Stalinist Hoxha regime in Albania, there are also a number of curiously sweeping
statements in the book. Considering the first years after the end of the Second World
War and the creation of the CIA, for example, it is argued that “[t]he decisive element
in the CIA’s worldwide intelligence ascendancy was its democratic provenance and
oversight” (). Certainly at the time, the CIA was more visible than the British
Secret Intelligence Service and was put on a proper legislative footing from the begin-
ning. Yet the period between the CIA’s creation in  and the formation in the
mid-s of the Pike and Church Committees with the aim of investigating
alleged wrongdoings by the CIA and other intelligence agencies is widely seen as a
period of non-oversight of the CIA. Congress did not show any political willingness
to scrutinize the intelligence realm.
The subtitle of the book is puzzling. This is not “The Story ofWestern Intelligence”
but a study of the Anglo-American intelligence relationship. Consequently, for major
parts of the book, countries other than the UK or the US are considered only in the
context of exploring dimensions and features of the Anglo-American relationship.
Only chapters  and  explicitly consider other European intelligence efforts.
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Exploring the transatlantic liaison arrangements, the book draws largely on the rich
existing academic literature on the subject and compiles the material in a concise
manner. The interview material seems primarily to concern the EU-related aspects of
the book.
Although the question of why Anglo-American intelligence established credibility
in the previous century is at the heart of this book, it has surprisingly little to say
about the question of why we should trust spies. The record of the liaison’s efficacy
and effectiveness has been patchy, as is clearly demonstrated in the book. Given the
title of the book, it would have been useful to explore in some depth public expect-
ations and willingness to trust their intelligence providers.
To conclude, this is a valuable addition to Jeffreys-Jones’s admirable work on
American intelligence. The book is an illuminating and concise evaluation of the
relationship between American and British intelligence services from infancy to
today. It will be useful to students of, and to those generally interested in, intelligence,
foreign policy and security studies.
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